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cerning the status of LSD. The minority, however, relied more upon
the technicalities of the administration of courts of law which restrict
them from being courts of justice. It appears that the minority opinion
was more concerned with the harmful effects of LSD and the need
for very strict laws in regard to it. If these two manners of judicial
opinion reflect the basic rationale for deciding a case of law, the
question which must be answered is: should technical legal precedent
be strained to further one policy over another policy backed only by
general, and not direct, precedent? The answer is that precedent and
policy must not be examined separately; but interwoven as the domi-
nant and essential element of a principle of law.
Richard D. Pompelio
CoRPoRATIoNs-FRAuuLENT PROXY STATEmENTS-SECuRITiES EXCHANGE
Acr oF 1934, § 14(a). A management proxy statement soliciting
minority votes for a proposed corporate merger was materially defec-
tive1 since it failed to disclose that the directors recommending the
merger were controlled by the other party to it.2 Rescission of the
merger was sought by plaintiffs who alleged violation of section 14(a),
the proxy fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
A federal district court held that a case of fraud had been established
by showing (1) that the proxy defect was material, and (2) that the
proxy votes were necessary for approval of the merger. However, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that if the
I The materiality of the defect was found by the trial court as a matter of
law on motion for summary judgment and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. 403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968).
2 Electric Auto-Lite Company, of which plaintiffs were minority shareholders,
had been under voting control of Mergenthaler Linotype Company, the other
party to the merger, and all 11 of Auto-Lite's directors were nominees of
Mergenthaler. The proxy statement told the minority shareholders simply that
the directors recommended the merger without disclosing their relationship to
Mergenthaler.3 Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a
national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to section 78 1 of this title.
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terms of the merger were fair, plaintiffs would have no case since the
merger would have been approved regardless of the defective proxy
statement, i.e. no causation would exist.4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Held: Reversed. Where the proxy solicitation is an
essential link in the accomplishment of the corporate transaction,
a showing that the proxy defect is material establishes sufficient causal
relationship between the violation and the injury without regard to
the fairness of the transaction. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company,
U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 616 (1970).
Much life has been pumped into section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by judicial decision in recent years. Unlike
other sections of the Act,5 section 14(a) made no provision for its
enforcement by private action and the existence of such a right was
in controversy. In 1964 the Supreme Court addressed itself to that
issue in 1. I. Case Company v. Borak,6 where plaintiff alleged violation
of SEC Rule 14a-9,7 promulgated under section 14(a) of the Act
to prohibit the use of materially false or misleading proxy statements.
Citing strong congressional policies of curbing proxy abuse and
insuring fair corporate suffrage,8 the Court recognized a private share-
holder's right of action, either direct or derivative, for violations of
section 14(a).1 Although unquestionably a milestone decision, the
Borak opinion evaded any discussion of the causal relationship which
must be shown to sustain a private proxy fraud action under the Act.10
A plaintiff in a common law action for fraud and deceit normally
is required to prove, inter alia, that the defendant's actions were both
-403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968).5 See § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964) and § 18(a) 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1964), both of which clearly grant private rights of action for violations of those
sections.
6 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
717 C.F.R. 240.14a-9(a) (1966):
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other com-
munication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time
and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state
any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not
false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier
communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same
meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
8 H.R. R . No. 1383. 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13, 14 (1934).
9 j. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432. Intertwined with the statement of
policy and congressional intent was the Court's pragmatic recognition of the fact
that the number of proxy statements examined by the SEC (more than 2000 per
year) necessitates a supplement to Commission action. The recognition of a




relied upon and responsible for the plaintiffs harm. 1 It is important
to note the distinction between the elements of reliance and causation
because the two are sometimes mistakenly lumped together and
referred to as "causation" or "Causal relationship." To illustrate, the
defendant's fraud may harm the plaintiff without any reliance by the
latter; or the plaintiff may rely on the fraud but he harmed by some
other force. The confusion may stem from the "supporting role" which
reliance plays to causation: once it is shown that the fraud prompted
plaintiff's action (reliance), one may infer that the fraud actually
caused the harm suffered (causation) .12 As illustrated above, however,
this is only an inference. Reliance can even be irrelevant to the issue
of causation, such as when the fraud harms one who has taken no
volitional action of his own.' 3 Litigation has centered around the need
for and the methods of proving both reliance and causation as they
relate to private fraud actions under the Act and causation has been
the more important of these issues.' 4 The related but independent
element of reliance is not further treated herein except as used in its
supporting role of inferring causation.
The first securities fraud case to grapple with the causation issue
which the Borak case had left unresolved was Barnett v. Anaconda
Company,'5 wherein a minority shareholder complained that ap-
proval for corporate dissolution was fraudulently obtained in violation
of section 14(a). The case was dismissed for failure to show that the
fraud caused the dissolution because the defendant owned enough
stock (seventy-three percent) to dissolve the corporation without
using the fraudulently obtained votes.' 6 Recognizing that this view of
causation scarcely protected the minority shareholder, some courts
began to find causation where the Barnett court would not.'7 . Lauren-
"13 Loss, SEcuiarrms REur.rLioN 1431 (2d ed. 1961). Additionally he
would have to allege and prove (1) a false representation (2) of a material fact(3) made with knowledge (scienter) of the falsity for the purpose of inducing
e plaintiff to rely on it. Id.
12 See Comment, 46 N.C. L. REv. 599, 626 (1968), citing List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d ir. 1965), in which the court enunciated the
supporting role" theory, explaining that proof of reliance is required because it
infers that the conduct of the defendant caused plaintiff's injury.
'3 See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Gir. 1967).
14 For an excellent and more cogent explanation of the relationship between
the elements of reliance and causation and the securities fraud case law involving
eachI see Comment, 46 N.C. L. REv. 599 (1968).
'5 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
16 "Tetransactions under attack did not result from the issuance of the
allegedly misleading proxy material which, in view of . . . Anaconda's 73%
stock holdings, could not have had anything to do with the approval or disapproval
and consummation of such transactions." 238 F. Supp. 766, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).1 7 E.g., Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Globus, Inc.
(Continued on next page)
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zano v. Einbender18 directly contradicted Barnett on similar facts in a
much more realistic approach to the causation issue. When the
defendant moved dismissal of the proxy fraud action on the ground
that it possessed enough majority votes to have approved the con-
tested action without using the fraudulently procured votes, the court
refused to rule as a matter of law that causation was absent, saying:
The [shareholders'] meeting does not become nugatory and dis-
pensable because one stockholder owns enough shares to carry any
resolution and can be expected to vote in favor of his own resolu-
tions. The vote is not legally pre-determined simply because it
seems practically predictable.... The misleading proxy material
deprives the meeting, and the majority stockholder, of the ex-
pressions of view and the votes that would have ensued upon
truthful disclosure .... 19
It is against this background of conflicting decisions that the Court
in the instant case addressed itself to the issue it had declined six
years ago to resolve. Two facts in the case strongly suggested that the
plaintiff deserved a trial on the merits. First, there was a material
omission in the proxy statement clearly in violation of Rule 14a-9; 20
secondly, the minority proxy votes were "necessary and indispensable
to the approval of the merger."2' On the other hand, the defendants
argued that if the terms of the merger were fair, the defrauded share-
holders should not be heard to complain because it could be justifiably
concluded that a sufficient number of voters would have approved
the merger had there been no fraud. The Court's choice to deny the
fairness of the merger as a defense can be functionally evaluated by
analyzing both the stated rationale and the underlying policies.
High on the list of reasons supporting the present holding is the
previously mentioned congressional policy of promoting fair corporate
suffrage2 2 and discouraging maneuvers designed to bypass minority
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F.
Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
18 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
19 Id. at 362. The court cautioned, however, that the mere existence of
fraudulent proxy material did not establish causation and that the material must
serve some transactional function: "It may be supposed that J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak requires that the accused proxy material ... have a transactional function
and not merely be randomly present in the context of the transaction with
respect to which a remedy is sought." Id. at 360.
In effect, the court is requiring that the fraudulent practice be material.
20 See note I supra.
21 __ U.S. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 619.
22 See note 8 supra, and accompanying text.
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stockholders. Additionally, a parade of horrors is forseeable if judicial
appraisal of the merger's fairness were required in every case of this
kind.23 There is also the fear that with fairness as a defense, fewer
proxy fraud challenges would be prosecuted by small stockholders,
adding weight to the SEC's already heavy burden.24 The objective
test of materiality,25 which must be met in order to state a cause of
action, is strongly preferred to a subjective inquiry into the number
of votes actually affected by the fraud; and the materiality requirement
itself functions to screen complaints of defects so insignificant as not
to affect the voting process. 26
Initially the decision appears to be a milestone in the trend toward
corporate democracy. Now the defrauded minority shareholder can
establish a cause of action under section 14(a) merely by showing that
proxies were obtained through use of a materially misleading solicita-
tion. Proof that the defect actually affected the voting is not necessary,
the Court holds, since proof of materiality "indubitably embodies a
conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might have
been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in
the process of deciding how to vote."27 Having thus established his
case, the plaintiff cannot be defeated by a showing that the transaction
was a fair one, for the presumption that the shareholders of every
corporation are willing to accept any fair transaction put before
them is not justified.28 Furthermore, the Court holds that once he
has established liability in this more simplified fashion, 29 the plaintiff
qualifies for an interim award of litigation expenses and reasonable
attorneys' fees, notwithstanding the lack of statutory authorization and
23 Mr. Justice Harlan may be hinting at this fear in one short sentence of
the opinion: [If liability could be foreclosed by a showing that the merger was
fair]. "[a] judicial appraisal of the merger's merits could be substituted for the
actual and informed vote of the stockholders." - U.S. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 620.
24Id., citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), in which the
Court observed that private enforcement of the proxy rules is a necessary supple-
ment to Commission action.
25 defect in a proxy solicitation is material, said the Court, if it is "of such
a character that it might have been considered important by a reasonable share-
holder who was in the process of deciding how to vote." - U.S. at -, 90 S. Ct.
at 621. Cf. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
26- U.S. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 621.
27 Id.
28 "But, in view of the many other factors that might lead shareholders to
prefer their current position to that of owners of a larger, combined enterprise, it
is pure conjecture to assume that the fairness of the proposal will always be
determinative of their vote." - U.S. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 620 n.5.2 9 
Ik this case, liability was established by a partial summary judgment
which was certified for appeal by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1958). Certiorari was granted as to the Court of Appeals decision, 394 U.S. 971(1969), and the issues of damages and relief remained to be considered by the
trial court after rendition of the instant decision.
1970]
KENTCucKY LAW jouRNAL[Vl5
the possible lack of a monetary recovery creating a fund from which
to pay the award. 0
However, the decision's apparent breadth may be deceiving and
the plaintiff may have won the battle only to lose the war. While
fairness is now irrelevant to the causation issue, it is still a factor to
be considered in determining damages and the appropriate remedy.
The disgruntled shareholder bent on having the corporate transaction
undone will find the court suddenly unsympathetic if he cannot
prove damages justifying that drastic a remedy, and that is likely the
case if transaction is fair. Money damages or an accounting may be
his only remedy and the fraudulently procured transaction would
remain intact. The most significant limitation, however, lies in the
application of the new causation requirement set forth by the Court.
Materiality is tantamount to proof of causation only where the proxy
solicitation is an "essential link" in the accomplishment of the corporate
transaction; where management controls enough votes to approve the
transaction without any minority votes, the instant holding is expressly
inapplicable. 1 Noted in the opinion, but left unresolved as a con-
sequence of this restriction, is the causation conflict between the
Borak and Laurenzano cases, because the proxy solicitations were not
essential links in the completion of those corporate transactions (i.e.,
the defendants each controlled enough votes to approve the respective
transactions without any minority votes). Failure to recognize this
restriction causes one to interpret this case as holding that proof of
materiality always obviates the need to show actual causation,32
while this is true only when management needed the proxy votes to
complete the transaction. The result is that the plaintiff cannot cite
the instant holding as mandatory authority in a Borak-Laurenzano
type fact situation. It can be expected, however, in view of the Court's
30". . . t~he stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and
informed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the
statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the corporation
and its shareholders [for which they should be reimnbursed]." - U.S. at -
90 S. Ct. at 627.31 - U.S. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 622 n.7.
32The Third Circuit Court of Appeals seem to have overstated the true scope
of the instant holding in the recent case of Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d
Cir. 1970). Discussing causation, the court stated, "In the recent Mills case, the
Supreme Court ruled that reliance on false or misleading proxy statements is not
required in order to set forth a cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act." Id. at 173. This blanket statement seems to sweep beyond the
true scope of the instant holding.
Kahan v. Rosenstiel is a highly significant case, however, in that it extends
the instant holding to fraud under section 10(b) and significantly liberalizes the
circumstances under which a defrauded minority plaintiff can be awarded counsel
fees and litigation expenses.
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heavy emphasis on corporate suffrage, its effort to ease the small
plaintiff's financial burden, and its not unfavorable reference to the
Laurenzano approach to causation, 3 that with the proper facts before
it, the Supreme Court will eventually hold that materiality of the
proxy defect establishes a cause of action in all section 14(a) fraud
cases.
Steve Hixson
EvIDENcE-ATroNEY-CLmNT Pm-v-EGE-THE ITEmNrrr OF THE CLmNT.
-Petitioner, an attorney, was called as a witness in a criminal trial
involving the alleged theft of a typewriter by Williams. Petitioner had
been the intermediary in the return of the typewriter to the police.
While on the witness stand, he testified that someone had phoned him
and employed him to deliver the typewriter to the police. He refused,
however, to reveal the name of the individual who employed him,
asserting that this information was a privileged communication which
he should not be compelled to disclose. He was found in contempt of
court' because of this refusal, and sought a writ of prohibition
restraining enforcement of the contempt rule. Held: Petition denied.
The identity of a person who employed an attorney to deliver stolen
property to the police is not privileged and therefore must be
disclosed by the attorney. Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538 (Ky.
1970).
33- U.S. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 622 n.7.
1 The difference between civil and criminal contempt is well established.
A commitment or fine for civil contempt is to coerce the witness. The
sentence for criminal contempt is not intended to coerce, but rather as a
punishment to vindicate the Courts authority. Tillotson v. Boughner,
350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals classified the contempt as civil. 453
S.W.2d at 542.
2 Writs of prohibition will issue from the Court of Appeals to prohibit actions
by inferior courts where, although proceeding within their jurisdiction, they are
exercising or are about to exercise it erroneously and there exists no adequate
remedy by appeal or otherwise, and great injustice and irreparable injury would
result to the applicant if they should do so. Stafford v. Bailey, 301 Ky. 155, 191
S.W.2d 218 (1945), Litteral v. Woods, 223 Ky. 582, 4 S.W.2d 395 (1928).
Appellant attorney, since he was not ayarty and did not represent the defendant,
had no adequate remedy by appeal an once the identity of his client is revealed
the harm is irreparable. Ky. R. Civ. P. 81 Provides:
Relief heretofore available by remedies of ... prohibition ... may be
obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion, for injunction
[or otherwise]....
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